

RURAL TOURISM P.A.C. CONCEPT (local) People, (local) Authorities, and the Consumer (of rural tourism services) CASE

The “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model”

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Abstract

The “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model (since 2002 Aug 14) is launched as an answer to the Kenneth Arrow “Impossibility Theorem” on Social Choice, Social Welfare (1951)

As people throughout the world are moving from the "political correct" behavior to an unexpected general behavior highlighting other priorities, a gap (between what we need and want we do), arises, a number of problems concerning global construction The scientific community is looking to find “new forms” thinking and reacting in a “new” environment” posed by the “New Technologies”

The “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model”- a methodological approach to ex-ante assess the requirements of innovations / interventions/up-grading strategies in sector's chains" is related with the game theory, especially the non-cooperative game theory as well as the “Impossibility Theorem” (Kenneth Arrow, 1951)

The “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” must succeed in”

1. Highlights the “community” (the “C” factor) in a third pole, at any bargain between two
2. Give an answer to Arrow's “Impossibility Theorem” just moving the scientific focus from “Voting” (Arrow) to “Bargaining” (Papakonstantinidis) for achieving the universal, all humanity request of “social welfare”
3. Synthesize a new proposal of social welfare based on the incompatibilities of other theorems, especially the Impossibility Theorem (Kenneth Arrow, 1951, Principle-Agent Problem, “Non-Cooperative Game” Theory
4. Provide the scientist and research community with a new methodological tool useful not only in the political conflict

- resolution and "social" satisfaction (if it exists)
5. Concerns a new equilibrium of a new bargaining perception of 3rd "part" between two taking into account that Community has equal participation at any deal between two, thus be a dummy variable in a "behavior-policies" regression model
 6. Starting the development process in LDC , by peer-pressure achievement (REGRATION ANALYSIS)
 7. Finding a "new" "social welfare form..." treating the community as a whole as an aggregate entity that participates in a social welfare game)
 8. As human beings are also considered to be reasonable and intelligent, oriented to individual interests, it is also reasonable to seek "social welfare" through social preference and social choice, There is consequently, a high correlation between "social welfare" and "social choice":. From this point of view they prefer a safe status, to develop their activities

Keywords: Social choice, Social welfare (if it exists) game, Political game, "Win - win- win papakonstantinidis" "Equilibrium" , Social welfare, The Impossibility Theorem (Arrow) Nash Equilibrium, The Incompleteness Theorem (Gödel) Pareto Efficiency, Voting Bargaining Moral Aggregation RURAL TOURISM the PAC Concept

Introduction: the Necessity of the "win-win-win concept"

After the USA Elections (NOE,2016) and the voting results in many EU countries (Austria, France, Poland, Hungary Poland) as well as, a number of referendums (the "BREXIT" case, the Scotland Referendum, the Greek Referendum (2015) show that people throughout the world are be moving from the "political correct" behavior to an unexpected general behavior highlighting other priorities and other internal focuses The EXIT-POLE Companies cannot predict the election results, while everywhere in the world, elected the outsiders politicians The cultural darkness which may lead the predominance of "political rationality" and of course the related laws that have been adopted by various European countries and "progressive" parties. All this literally trivialize any notion of free speech and artistic expression It seems that peoples' behavior is changing in a very interesting "transition CHOICES period" people in a very interesting transition period, but to everyone touts a simple message. The people are tired of the "politically correct" choices and seek initiatives without myopic blinders

Social Choice –Social Welfare

Impossibility Theorem: the Incentive for this article

Social choice theory or social choice is a theoretical framework for analysis of

combining individual opinions, preferences, interests, or welfares to reach a collective decision or social welfare in some sense.

In social choice theory, Arrow's impossibility theorem, or, the general possibility theorem or Arrow's paradox is an impossibility theorem stating that when voters have three or more distinct alternatives (options), no ranked order voting system can convert the ranked preferences of individuals into a community-wide (complete and transitive) ranking while also meeting a pre-specified set of criteria, unrestricted domain, non-dictatorship, Pareto efficiency, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. The theorem is often cited in discussions of voting theory as it is further interpreted by the Gibbard – Satterthwaite theorem.

Social choice blends elements of welfare economics and voting theory. It is methodologically individualistic, in that it aggregates preferences and behaviors of individual members of society.

Also, the Gibbard– Satterthwaite theorem, named after Allan Gibbard and Mark Satterthwaite, is a result about the deterministic voting systems that choose a single winner using only ballots from voters (with a finite number of possible ballot types). The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem states that, for three or more candidates, one of the following three things must hold for every voting rule:

1. The rule is dictatorial (i.e., there is a single individual who can choose the winner), or
2. There is some candidate who can never win, under the rule, or
3. The rule is susceptible to tactical voting, in the sense that there are conditions under which a voter with full knowledge of how the other voters are to vote and of the rule being used would have an incentive to vote in a manner that does not reflect his or her preferences

Definitions

1. **Welfare Economics Definitions**

Welfare economics focuses on the optimal allocation of resources and goods and how the allocation of these resources affects social welfare. This relates directly to the study of income distribution and how it affects the common good. Welfare economics is a subjective study that may assign units of welfare or utility to create models that measure the improvements to individuals based on their personal scales.

2. Pareto efficiency, or Pareto optimality, is a state of allocation of resources in which it is impossible to make any one individual better off without making at least one individual worse off. The term is named after Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), Italian engineer and economist, who used the concept in his studies of economic efficiency and income

distribution. The concept has applications in academic fields such as economics, engineering, and the life sciences.

3. Ethics or moral philosophy is a branch of philosophy that involves systematizing, defending, and recommending concepts of right and wrong conduct. The term ethics derives from the Ancient Greek word "ἠθικός" ethikos, which is derived from the word ἦθος ethos (habit, "custom"). The branch of philosophy axiology comprises the sub-branches of ethics and aesthetics, each concerned with values.
4. Moral Aggregation is one of the fundamental features of utilitarianism and other forms of axiological theories, permitting the trade-off of morally relevant factors between different individuals. It is also a feature that critics of utilitarianism such as John Rawls, Thomas Nagel, and T. M. Scanlon condemn. As a branch of philosophy, ethics investigates the questions "What is the best way for people to live?" and "What actions are right or wrong in particular circumstances?" In practice, ethics seeks to resolve questions of human morality, by defining concepts such as good and evil, right and wrong, virtue and vice, justice and crime. As a field of intellectual enquiry, moral philosophy also is related to the fields of moral psychology, descriptive ethics, and value theory.

Fundamental theorems of welfare economics

The First Theorem states that a market will tend toward a competitive equilibrium that is weakly Pareto optimal when the market maintains the following three attributes: (a) complete markets - No transaction costs and because of this each actor also has perfect information, and (b) price-taking behavior - No monopolists and easy entry and exit from a market. (c) Furthermore, the First Theorem states that the equilibrium will be fully Pareto optimal

The second fundamental theorem states that given further restrictions, any Pareto efficient outcome can be supported as a competitive market equilibrium. Measuring economic efficiency is often subjective, relying on assumptions about the social good, or welfare, created and how well that serves consumers. A "win-win-win equilibrium" is stronger than measurement "economic equilibrium": "Community" (the 3rd win, in a bargaining between 2), as a discrete entity, includes quality elements of any bargain (as equality, justice, democracy, standard of living,...) From this point of view, "Community" is a rather imagination, a point where we want to go, as 'GLOBAL SOCIETY'

Aim-Objective

The aim of this theoretical contribution (if it exists) is to highlight the

"SENSITIZATION ABILITY" in the form of the "Intermediate Community" or the 3rd win in the suggested model

In particular, the proposal deals with the collecting, classifying and comparing the theoretical material from various sources on the functioning of Social Welfare Function (SWF), towards building a strong case with logical and coherent arguments, towards the one Triple Pole (A-B-COMMUNITY) Equilibrium (TPE), different from N.E, that leads to the Social Bargaining Solution" (SBS) and coincide with the "optimal" Community Collective Choice (CCC) in order to create a highly versatile tool, "the win-win-win papakonstantinidis model" of well-formed formulas (wffs),

Methodology

To manipulate with Incompatibilities, by the utility theory:

1. The impossibility theorem (1951 Kenneth Arrow: book: Social Choice and Individual Values, as well as the Amartya Sen "liberal paradox"
2. the theorem of incompleteness (Kurt Gödel (1931)
3. the Nash Equilibrium in Nash "Non cooperative Game Theory 1951(annals of Mathematics, 1951 Vol. 54, No. 2 (Sep., 1951), pp. 286-295)
4. The "Pareto optimality in a 3D space according to

This work intends to prove that "social welfare" can coexist with the capitalist economic model but if based on a "tri-polar" (instead of bipolar) perception of any interaction between people, local communities, organizations, states, blocs Member ...including the Community (The Intermediate Community- the "C" factor), in 3D space, with the community as "rainbow" synthesis/analysis It is the "rainbow concept"

According to the "Impossibility Theorem (Kenneth Arrow (1951), "Social Choice" does not exist: It is impossible and more persons to agree each other: "If we exclude the possibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility, then the only methods of passing from individual tastes to social preferences which will be satisfactory and which will be defined for a wide range of sets of individual orderings are either imposed or dictatorial."

According to the "win-win-win papakonstantinidis model" the Voting problem does not exist (in its ideal form) , due cooperative process, resulting from the sensitization process rural GR villages exam

Model Generator:

A Model Born by Model (MBM), 2014

Due to its nature,(action-reaction) the "win-win-win papakonstantinidis model has been applied in a number of scientific fields (Management, Marketing,

Psychology, History and even Biology)

The most important case came by Professor G. Spais who created an overall new model only for marketing: the "Spais-Papakonstantinidis L-and Papakonstantinidis S model

Previous Work

Previous work on bargaining / games:

Recently, Xie and Wei (2009) paper's addressed channel coordination by seeking optimal cooperative advertising strategies and equilibrium pricing in a two-member distribution channel. They established and compared two (2) models: a non-cooperative, leader-follower game and a cooperative game.

Huang, Li and Mahajan (2002) based on their remark that the relationship between manufacturer and retailer implies the dominance of the manufacturer over retailers regarding to cooperative advertising, they discussed how manufacturer and its retailers interact in order to adjust cooperative advertising. The authors explored the role of cooperative advertising in a manufacturer-retailer supply chain through brand name investments,

Based on beggar-thy-neighbor aspect of commodity advertising (which means that benefits to one commodity from advertising come at the expense of other commodities), Crespi and James (2007) offered a bargaining solution, which was an extension of the Nash model.

Yue, Austin, Wang and Huang (2006) studied the coordination of cooperative advertisement in a manufacturer-retailer supply chain when the manufacturer offered price deductions to customers. a supply chain, the authors recommended that coordination in local and national cooperative advertising \

Originality of the paper - contribution to knowledge

Bargaining seems to be critical for marketing channel coordination, e.g., for vertical coop advertising (Ailawadi, Beauchamp, Donthu, Gauri and Shankar, 2009; Huang, Li and Mahajan, 2002) or resolving channel member conflicts and for setting trade terms such as transfer special prices and margins according to Coughlan, Anderson, Stern and El-Ansary (2001). There is a significant literature on how constructs such as bargaining problem (Xie and Wei, 2009) tendency to conflict (Zhuang, Herndon and Zhou, 2005) In contrast, the normative and behavioral principles governing marketing channel dependency and coordination regarding to tendency to sovereignty, tendency to improvement and mistrust are relatively unexplored. Encouragingly, the literature reaffirms critical the role of bargaining in marketing channels (Coughlan, Anderson, Stern and El-Ansary, 2001).

Timeless in the 300 years of scientific development of bargaining and game theories (see Table 1):. A selective view on the international literature (by grouped disciplines) is presented in the following table

Economics	Sociology	Rural development/Rural tourism management and development	Knowledge management and Innovation Management	Marketing/Decision Sciences/ Entrepreneurship	Other
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Nash, J. F. (1950). The bargaining problem. <i>Econometrica</i>, 18, 155-162. Nash, J. F. (1951). Non cooperative games. <i>Annals of Mathematics</i>, 54, 286-295. Nash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium points in n-person games. <i>Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences</i>. Nash, J. F. (1953). Two-person cooperative games. <i>Econometrica</i>, 21, 128-140 Neuman (von) & Morgenstern ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- Harsanyi, J. (1967, November). Games with incomplete information, played by Bayesian players. <i>Contribution</i> (Nobel 1994) <i>Management Science</i>, 11(3). Kuhn, H. W., & Nasar, S. (2001). The essential John Nash (pp. 31, 43, 56, 85-89, 99-103). Princeton University Press. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coleman J (1988) "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital" <i>American Journal of Sociology</i> 94 Supplement 95-S120 Chicago University Weber, Max. 1895/1994. "The Nations State and Economic Policy (Freiburg Address)" in Weber: <i>Political Writings</i>. ed./trans. P. Lassman and R. Speirs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Arnstein, Sherry R.(1969) "A Ladder of Citizen Participation," <i>Journal of the America Planning Association- JAIP</i>, Vol. 35, No. 4, Friedmann J and Weaver C (1979) "Territory and Function: The Evolution of Regional Planning University of California Press" U.C.L.A. Press (U.S) Berkley and Los Angeles California Papakonstantinidis L.A (2003) "Rural Tourism: "Win-Win-Win" <i>Journal of Hospitality and Tourism</i> Volume 1, issue 2, 2003 pp 49-70. INDIA ISSN 0972-7787 www.johat.com Kokossis Charis and al. (2002) "Sustainable Rural Tourism" Papazissis Ed. Greece trnsl, p.p 322-325 Brugger E 1986 "Endogenous Development: a concept between utopia and reality" 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fischer Manfred M (2006) Knowledge, complexity, and innovation systems <i>Journal of Geographical Systems</i> 2006) Edition: Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. KG Papakonstantinidis L.A (2004) "Knowledge Creation and the win-win-win model" <i>Scientific Review of Applied Economics TEIPI</i> Ed, Jan 2004 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Spais, G., Papakonstantinidis, L. and Papakonstantinidis, S. ----- ----- ----- management decisions', <i>Innovative Marketing</i>, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp.7-29. Spais, G. and Papakonstantinidis, L. (2011) 'An application of the win-win-win Papakonstantinidis model as an innovative bargaining solution analysis in cooperative sales promotion campaigns', <i>Proceedings of the 4th Annual Euromed Conference of the Euromed Academy of Business</i>, pp.1724-1744. Spais, G. (2012) 'An integrated bargaining solution analysis for vertical cooperative sales promotion campaigns based on the win-win-win Papakonstantinidis model', <i>Journal of Applied Business Research</i>, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp.359-383. Papakonstantinidis (2012) The win-win-win Papakonstantinidis model - A behavioral analysis in dynamical systems The Non Instrumental Rationality Paradox. Case-study: Hellenic Benefactors ISBEFA (Book of Proceedings) Kefallinia GR 2012 Spais, G. and Papakonstantinidis, L. (2012) 'An exploratory study of brand manufacturers' perceived value of the 'triple pole' approach in bargaining for vertical cooperative sales promotion campaign: a pilot study in Greece and Cyprus', <i>Proceedings of the 5th Annual Euromed Conference of the Euromed Academy of</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pavlov Ivan P. (1927) <i>Conditioned Reflexes: An Investigation of the Physiological Activity of the Cerebral Cortex</i>" Translated by G. V. Anrep (1927) Oxford University Press LONDON

Source: Spais-Papakonstantinidis, L. (2013)

Previous work (selections):

On Rural Tourism strategy Strategies and techniques as the "bottom-up approach" (Wilkinson Kenneth, 1991, Stochr W and Taylor R. 1981) the encourage the community's endogenous force" (Garofoli and Latella, 1989) or motivating local people around a "flag theme" (Thirion S, 2000) locally has contributed in the development theoretical view and practice, from 80s. Also, Local Action Group's (LAG's operation, (Leader EU Initiative, R 4253/88) have enriched our experience on the rural-local development field This presentation starts from this point: (i) I've tried to give an alternative interpretation of the "community development through public involvement (basically) in the local action of rural tourism Market analysis (as "best response" interaction's game), and also the game of behaviour/ knowledge in and during the bargain among

the 3 local power poles (the PAC triangular layout) are the pillars on which the 3-win model was based: (ii) The 3-win model has been included in the bibliography of social sciences This model also includes the sensitization process as a form of knowledge which is transferred either from tacit or codified and from conceptual to the sensitized knowledge, (see neural nets, Modern Innovation Theory Fischer M.M. 2006) thus producing useful material for planning the development process (iii) Next, I've tried to compose the literature on market and behaviour research in an integrated overview, on the "Community Development-Public Involvement- Rural Tourism" complex synthesis, in order to produce conclusions, comparing them with the old problem of "welfare economics" and the "Impossibility Theorem" (Kenneth Arrow, 1950)The "win-win-win": WHAT IS ?

This work started with a simplistic syllogism: Capitalism with its fundamental axioms of the "free market" and "competition" has solved many problems but created more

Win-win-win is mainly a "methodological tool" focused on the "Community's(State..) role as "Moral Aggregation"(see math Appendix) This "new idea" of Community in the aggregation role is the most important win-win-win papakonstantinidis model's "contribution" (if it is)

It is, secondly, an "Agency Theory" (or an application of the agency theory) because the individual must go beyond narrow personal interest and thought about the man who is to him and negotiates with him. This is the core of the suggestion

It is a bargaining theory (or an application of bargaining theory

Finally, and the most important, win-win-win papakonstantinidis model is a "node" to aggregate preferences occurs in many disciplines: in welfare economics, where one attempts to find an economic outcome which would be acceptable and stable; in decision theory, where a person has to make a rational choice based on several criteria; and most naturally in voting systems, which are mechanisms for extracting a decision from a multitude of voters' preferences. But why, the two original parts (A-B) must accept an entity, "C" (whatever it is), in a bargain between them which do not come from the set of possible positions defined by the competition of their individual interests?


The answer has been given by J.J Rousseau: Because people are very clever, to recognize that "safety" "free market" "state services" are stronger arguments than absolute personal interest and so to active inside, by accepting its limitations, putting by society-community or State

Economic Math:

MRS: The new 3-pole equilibrium in a win-win-win concept

People try in a competitive game, every moment to maximize personal/individual profit. But the marginal utility of a good or service declines

as its available supply increases. That is the economics, the law of diminishing marginal utility states that the marginal utility of a good or service declines as its available supply increases. Economic actors devote each successive unit of the good or service towards less and less valued ends. When the function became MAX (or in the neighborhood of MAX) then the marginal the addition quantity become less and more less in the zero neighborhood or even ZERO (ideal case) This (near to ZERO quantity) is been formed by the 1st derivative of f(x) –see graph bellow.




ΠΑΠΑΚΩΝΣΤΑΝΤΙΝΙΔΗΣ 2008

$$\text{slope } \frac{\text{change in } Y}{\text{change in } X} = 1^{\text{ST}} \text{ DERIVATIVE OF } U'=f(x)', \text{ possible N.E}$$

Source: Papakonstantinidis (2008)

The derivative of a function of a real variable measures the sensitivity to change of a quantity (a function value or dependent variable) which is determined by another quantity (the independent variable). Derivatives are a fundamental tool of calculus. For example, the derivative of the position of a moving object with respect to time is the object's velocity: this measures how quickly the position of the object changes when time is advanced.


From this "RULE" a crucial condition happens:



Win-win-win Equilibrium

From the two graphs above, and the "Pareto Efficiency" (even the "Weak Pareto Efficiency") CONDITION, the famous (since mid -1700's the law of diminishing marginal returns goes by a number of different names, including law of diminishing returns, principle of diminishing marginal productivity and law of variable proportions.

It is: $If .u = f(x) .is .a .utility .function ., .then . \frac{d(f(x))}{dx} , or . . f(x)' .is .its .MARGINAL .UTILITYFUNCTION$



As the rational individual objective is to MAXIMIZE individual profit then on the MAX POINT in his/her Utility function the additional marginal quantity must be zero or in the neighborhood of ZERO

It is assumed that the MAX Utility function for all people MARGINAL UTILITY ZERO

If U_A, U_B, U_C are UTILITY FUNCTIONS of A, B AND C then the product $U_A * U_B * U_C$ responds social welfare. So if the product $U_A * U_B * U_C$ MAX then MRS that is the END of the development process IDEAL CASE. We can measure the result in terms of deviation from ideal case. The win-win-win papakonstantinidis EQUILIBRIUM

$$U_A \cap U_B \cap U_C = U_A * U_B * U_C$$

$$U_A * U_B * U_C = MAX. \rightarrow (U_A * U_B * U_C)' = 0. or$$

$$(U_A * U_B * U_C) \approx max, \dots then, (U_A * U_B * U_C) \approx 0$$

PARETO EFFICIENCY

$$\max \dots Utility \dots Function : \dots \max U(x_1 \dots x_n)$$

$$\sum p_i x_i \leq M, \dots x_i \geq 0, \dots \forall x_i \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$$

$px_i = prices * quantities .x_i$

$\Sigma = sum .of .products * quantities .(px_i)$

$$U = u * p :$$

$$U_A = u_A * p_A$$

$$U_B = u_B * p_B$$

$$U_C = u_C * p_C$$

$U =$ pleasant..experiance..according.to...a...strictly..personal... positive..list
 $u =$ individual...utils..(not.measuring)
 $p:$ probabilities,these..pleasant...experiance's..utils..to.ocure.in.the...A.B.C...individuals

$$U_A U_B, U_C$$

when,

$$U_A = x$$

$$U_B = y$$

$$U_C = (100 - x - y)$$

$$U_A \cap U_B \cap U_C = U_A * U_B * U_C = \max$$

for..this..must.be..($U_A * U_B * U_C$) = 0..(or.in.neighborhod.of..ZERO)

$$xy(100 - x - y)^n, \max \Rightarrow [xy(100 - x - y)^n]' = 0$$

$$(f(x) \cdot g(x))' = f'(x)g(x) + f(x) \cdot g'(x)$$

$$\left(\frac{f(x)}{g(x)}\right)' = \frac{f'(x) \cdot g(x) - f(x) \cdot g'(x)}{(g(x))^2}$$

$$U_A \cap U_B \cap U_C = U_A * U_B * U_C = \max$$

$$(U_A * U_B * U_C)' = 0$$

$$u_i = f_i(x)$$

$$xy(100 - x - y)^n = \max \rightarrow [xy(100 - x - y)^n]' = 0$$

$$[xy(100 - x - y)^n]' = x'y(100 - x - y)^n + xy'(100 - x - y)^n = xy[(100 - x - y)^n]' = 0$$

$$xy(100 - x - y)^n]' = y(100 - x - y)^n + x(100 - x - y)^n + nxy(100 - x - y)^{n-1} = 0$$

$$(f(x) * g(x))' = f'(x) * g(x) + f(x) * g'(x)$$

$$[xy(100 - x - y)^n]' =$$

$$y(100 - x - y)^n + x(100 - x - y)^n + nxy(100 - x - y)^{n-1} = 0$$

$$It...must :xy(100 - x - y)^n = \max \rightarrow \lim_{x \rightarrow \infty} [xy(100 - x - y)^n]' = 0$$

$$\sup...that..(100 - x - y) \neq 0$$

$$y(100 - x - y) + x(100 - x - y) + nxy * 1 = 0$$

$$(x + y)(100 - x - y) + nxy = 0 \Rightarrow \left(\frac{x + y}{xy}\right)(100 - x - y) = (-1)n.....by..putting.....\frac{x + y}{xy} = \lambda > 0$$

$$\lambda(100 - x - y) = (-1)n \Rightarrow (100 - x - y) = \frac{-n}{\lambda} = (-n) \frac{1}{\lambda}$$

but,....(100 - x - y) = % ..Community.."share"..of...o..budget..,b = 1.....EXPECTED..payoff...from.."b = 1"

% ..Community...share = (-n) \frac{1}{\lambda} (b).....the..(-n)...denotes,,the..reduction
 result...which..comes..from..the..Community.."reaction"..in..any..BARGAIN,..(by...its...3rd...role,...,d.e
 as..an..Agent..of..the..CITIZEN..-..PRINCIPALr elation,..Arbitrator,.., and ..as..the..
 Indepented..3rd..barty)..to..the..total..budget.."b" ...of..the..BARGAIN

then...the..ith..player; s.best.mixed...strategy(probability = ..a..lottery..over..
 a..trinomial...distribution),is..the..best..strategies..for..himself..as..well..as..the..best...strategies
 ..for..the..other..players,aswell.as.the.best.strategy..
 for..the..Community..(the..common...welfare)

notes :

A, B, C...do,,,not...cooperate..forward

A, B, C...must...collaborate...in...and...during...the...bargain... (ins tant. reflection..winning..strategies)

"C" ...expresses...not...only...the...rest... (no..bargain...participants), ,but...also...the...total...community...the...word cultural...heritage...world...cultivation...the... "human...being"... "Homo...Sapiens"

From...this...point...of...view...Community...participation...in...any...bargain...between.TWO(2)...is..n...necessary

Also,..COMMUNITY – the.." c" ..factor..MUST...exp res.s.the.." Community..Fear" ..from.the...bargain,..between..A, B

For.this.."Community..participation"..is..captured..as... $(100 - x - y)^n$, where..n = the..fear..factor..(nonlinear),while the..A, B..utility..functions...must..be..linear


$$\lambda = 1, x * \% \dots \frac{n}{1} \% = 100\% = \max(\text{quite.unequality.and.unjustice.in.distribution.of.A,B,and.Community})$$

$$\lambda = 2 \dots x * \% = \frac{n}{2} \% = 50 - 50 - 0$$

$$\lambda = 3 \dots x * \% = \frac{n}{3} \% = 333.333 \dots \text{IDEAL...SITUATION}$$

$$\lambda = 4 + \dots x * \% = \frac{x}{4+} \% = \text{UNSTABLE.(THEOCHARIS – OSCILLATION)...of..A, B, C..expectations}$$

UNSTABLE EQUILIBRIUM¹ for $\lambda \geq 4$, endless..oscillation



Win-lose

win-win

win-win-win Papakonstantinidis model

¹ José S. Cánovas, Tõnu Puub, Manuel Ruizc (2008) The Cournot-Theocharis Problem Reconsidered" Chaos, Solitons & Fractals Volume 37, Issue 4, August 2008, Pages 1025–1039 888

"Win-win-win application: The P.A.C Strategy (Rural Tourism)

The P.A.C strategy process toward integration: RURAL TOURISM

In the RURAL TOURISM sector application we study whether community participation in sustainable rural tourism promotes the local-rural development or not, and investigate the potential evolutions and research challenges on the rural-local development process based on the "win-win-win papakonstantinidis model". The model is a "triple pole" continuous local bargaining approach that could concern "the real assets of a region" (actors, entrepreneurs, politicians, work force of organizations, material and financial resources and regional culture of co-operation, communication and competition). The main hypothesis of this study is that development may be sighted as the output of the bargaining trends, inside the community. From this point of view, Local Development as a local management process tables a number of questions, mainly concerned on conflict resolution between the three power local poles. As the three poles are in a constant negotiations, then each of them should prevailed over the other two, thus introducing in the bargaining problem. Bargaining behavior must

therefore be defined. The "win-win-win papakonstantinidis" conceptualization tries to find ways for the 3-poles bargaining conceptual equilibria, under conditions, thus maximizing expected utilities for all the involved parts in local decision making. Practically, it may support that public involvement -in terms of "knowledge creation" and "pure individual strategies" is concerned with Rural Tourism and Rural Development. Involving local people in the development process round a local "Flag Theme" is therefore necessary. This study focuses on the sensitization process as the reaction to given information, which influences the socio-economic behavior in the local bargain.

The P.A.C Concept

Three points, consists the presentation: (a) the market, (b) human behavior and (c) the game as a field of human behavior, in and during the bargain (risk, game fighter, risk aversion) introducing a triangular perspective that characterizes the presentation: LEADER EU Initiative, as well as the Local Action Group's Philosophy have been based on this idea. The basic idea is very simple: Suppose there are only, three (3) people around the planet where everyone is trying to optimize his/her personal situation, in a continuous bargain with other 2, (competitors) by using the instrumental rationality as a "tool of mind" Each of the 3 is quite indifferent for the other two situation, or feelings. In that case, it should be proved that the best response for each of them is to call the other two in the pure and absolute cooperation for their own survival.

The "prize" of each of their Mixed Individual Strategies (decisions) is his/her survival (as a total): You can imagine-now- the local community survival as the result of the cooperation among 3-pole local power poles (PAC) towards a common goal (Community Survival in a globalized world) The European "tool" for this, is the L.E.A.D.E.R EU Initiative (since 1991). From this point of view, it is assumed that each of the PAC members is "Buyer" and "Seller" of the same need (survival) of the others simultaneously (in accordance with Spais, 2012). Based on this simple concept, the 3-pole (People Authorities, Consumers) active behavior produces outcomes -ensuring that the PAC equilibrium may exist thus promoting the collective PAC choice (Sen, 1984)- through cooperation, despite the existence of the "Impossibility Theorem" (Arrow, 1950). Considering this idea, we may say that the role of the suggested "win-win-win papakonstantinidis model" is the integration of the (PAC)'s multifold system, in its development perspective. Therefore, "PAC equilibrium" is the key-point of the paper, as it meets all the community development conditions. This triangular layout defines the necessity of the "sensitization process", which is introduced as the "integrated information" in the local development process. Besides, it is argued that local involvement in the development process is going through constant

sensitization of the local population. The Sensitization could be taught as "added information" (Papakonstantinidis, 2004). From this point, the "behavior side" is considered.

Section Vi: Final Proposal

Win - win-win: from the behavior side

According to Spais (Spais 2012) the win-win-win papakonstantinidis model is a methodological tool for conflict resolution, especially in the case of decision-making, or in forming "instant reflection winning strategies" in the bargain (which is the frame

From the other, "sensitization" may be concerned as an information, thus changed the 3 parts' imperfect information, into a complete information as Harsanyi's conditional probabilities claims. It is a hard process in the bargain, which smoothes the angles of conflict or the payoffs/utilities (according to Nash) The "third win" may be an umbrella, which conjoins different "dipolar relationships" Especially, in the local management context, it must be understood that the existence of a "distinguishable entity", depends upon the degree of understanding and sensitization of knowing better the other polar (Spais, Papakonstantinidis and Papakonstantinidis, 2009). For the needs of the study, I adjust the conceptualization, in order to deal with local management and development decisions The win-win-win perception is based on the assumptions of information accessibility and diffusion that characterize the modern globalized societies as well as the complexity in the decision-making values that the "third win" (the "C" factor) could unlock a series of obstacles (Spais, Papakonstantinidis and Papakonstantinidis, 2009). Another idea, is that the individual three-by-two, (although doubts) must take into consideration at each time that there is the third distinguishable part (Spais, 2012) in the bargain, based on behaviorist analysis through the "neural networks". Resent literature on behavioral analysis, provides us with the relation between knowledge and behavior So, an overview is attempt (Papakonstantinidis, 2005), as to find the relation between "knowledge transfer and knowledge creation", in the frame of the "Modern Innovation Theory- M.I.T" (Fischer M.M, 2006 Nonaka and others) Behavior thus may resulted from this knowledge types' synthesis, as the table below

$$\left[\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \sum_{i=1}^n \text{knowledge} \rightarrow \text{knowledge}'s..synthesis \rightarrow \text{behavior}...synthesis \rightarrow \text{behavior}..change \rightarrow \text{new.bargaining}..conditions \right]$$

Table 3: Knowledge Creation and Transfer- Types of Behavior

Type of Knowledge-1	Type of Knowledge-2	Synthesis	Resulted Behavior
<i>tacit</i>	<i>tacit</i>	<i>Sympathetic</i>	<i>Socialization</i>
<i>tacit</i>	<i>codified</i>	<i>Conceptual</i>	<i>Externalization</i>
<i>codified</i>	<i>tacit</i>	<i>Procedural</i>	<i>Internalization</i>
<i>codified</i>	<i>codified</i>	<i>Systemic</i>	<i>Networking</i>
<u><i>sympathetic</i></u>	<u><i>systemic</i></u>	<u><i>Conceptual</i></u>	<u><i>Sensitization</i></u>
<i>systemic</i>	<i>systemic</i>	<i>Procedural</i>	<i>Strategic</i>

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The Mayor in some Greek Villages, is elected by lot, Also, in *Ancient Greek Democracy*, the King was elected by lot, due the idea that all citizens were able for this (to be "Kings)

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